Monday, November 16, 2026

One bug from a halt

How much of each blockchain runs on the same software, and why that decides whether a single bug can stop it.

Why one program can stop a chain

In plain words: a blockchain is only as diverse as the software its validators run.

What the thresholds mean

Above one-third

Proof-of-stake chains need about two-thirds of validators to agree. If software run by more than a third of the stake crashes, the rest cannot reach two-thirds: Sui, Cosmos, Aptos and similar chains stop making blocks, and Ethereum keeps making blocks but stops finalizing them.

Above two-thirds

A client this big can do worse than stop the chain. If it has a bug, it can finalize a wrong chain on its own. Validators running it can then be stuck on that chain or slashed when they try to leave.

Single implementation

Every validator runs the same program, so one bad release can halt everyone at once, however many validators there are. Most chains are in this group. Ethereum, Solana and Bitcoin are the main exceptions.

Proof-of-work

Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin have no voting threshold. Miners keep making blocks, so a software bug splits the chain in two instead of stopping it.

Chains with more than one client

Only a few chains have competing software, and for most of them the mix can be measured from public data. Refreshed twice a day.

ChainLargest clientSoftware mixWhat it means
Ethereum
Execution layer
Nethermind 42.9%
Over one-third
Nethermind 42.9%Geth 42.8%Besu 8.4%Reth 3.3%Erigon 2.7%Nethermind and Geth are each above one-third: a crash bug in either one alone would stop Ethereum from finalizing until fixed. Blocks would keep coming. Covers about 59% of validators, those that reveal their client.
supermajority.info via clientdiversity.org, 15 Nov 2026
Ethereum
Consensus layer
Lighthouse 47.1%
Over one-third
Lighthouse 47.1%Nimbus 19.1%Prysm 17.6%Teku 6.4%Unknown 3.2%Lodestar 2.7%Erigon 2.3%Grandine 1.6%Lighthouse is above one-third: a crash bug in it alone would stop Ethereum from finalizing until fixed. Blocks would keep coming.
Miga Labs via clientdiversity.org, 15 Nov 2026
Solana
By active stake
Agave codebase 81.5%
Over two-thirds
Agave and Agave-based (Jito, BAM, Harmonic, Rakurai) 81.5%Firedancer family (incl. Frankendancer, Harmonic, FireBAM) 18.1%Other / unknown 0.4%Jito, BAM, Harmonic and Rakurai builds are modified Agave, so one Agave bug can hit them all. Frankendancer, counted with Firedancer, still runs parts of Agave, so the real Agave share is higher. Solana halts if more than one-third of stake stops voting.
Stakewiz validator list, share of active stake, 15 Nov 2026
Bitcoin
Reachable nodes
Bitcoin Core 89.9%
Split risk, not halt
Bitcoin Core 89.9%Bitcoin Knots 9.8%Other 0.3%Proof-of-work has no one-third or two-thirds threshold: miners keep making blocks, so a consensus bug splits the chain instead of halting it, as in March 2013. Knots is a patched Bitcoin Core and shares most consensus code. This counts nodes, not mining power.
Bitnodes crawl of 18,862 reachable nodes (user agents), 15 Nov 2026
BNB ChainBSC client (Geth fork)
One dominant client
Share not publishedValidators do not publish which client they run. Almost all run the official bsc client, a Geth fork; a Reth-based client exists, but its share cannot be measured from public data.
Official repositories and docs, checked 12 Nov 2026
PolkadotPolkadot SDK node (Parity)
One dominant client
Share not publishedMost validators run Parity's node built from the Polkadot SDK. Independent clients exist (KAGOME, Gossamer), but validators do not publish which one they run, so their share is unknown.
Official repositories and docs, checked 12 Nov 2026
Zcashzcashd and Zebra
Split risk, not halt
Share not publishedZcash has two full-node implementations: zcashd (being retired) and Zebra from the Zcash Foundation. Proof-of-work: a disagreement between them would split the chain rather than halt it. Their share is not published.
Official repositories and docs, checked 12 Nov 2026

One sequencer: rollups

On these rollups a single company runs the only block producer. Client diversity barely matters here: if that sequencer or its software fails, blocks stop for everyone, as Base did twice in June 2026. Users can still force transactions through Ethereum, but slowly.

One program for every validator

Most chains have a single production client. One bad release can stop all validators at once, however many there are.

ChainSoftwareNotes
Polygon PoSBor + HeimdallValidators run Polygon's Bor (a Geth fork) for blocks and Heimdall for checkpoints and milestones. There is no independent second client in production.
Avalanche C-ChainAvalancheGoAll validators run AvalancheGo, maintained by Ava Labs.
Suisui-nodeAll validators run the same sui-node software from Mysten Labs, so a bug in one release can stop the whole network. That is what happened in the 2024–2026 halts listed below.
Aptosaptos-nodeAll validators run aptos-core, maintained by Aptos Labs.
TRONjava-tronThe 27 super representatives run java-tron, the only production client.
Cosmos HubGaia (CometBFT)Validators run gaiad on CometBFT. There is one implementation.
Osmosisosmosisd (CometBFT)Validators run osmosisd on CometBFT. There is one implementation.
Celestiacelestia-app (CometBFT)Validators run celestia-app on CometBFT. There is one implementation.
Cardanocardano-node (Haskell)Block producers run the Haskell cardano-node. Alternative nodes (Amaru, Dingo) are in development, not in block production.
TONTON node (C++)Validators run the reference C++ node from the TON core team.
XRP LedgerrippledValidators run rippled, the only production server.
LitecoinLitecoin CoreNodes and miners run Litecoin Core. Proof-of-work: a bug would split the chain rather than halt it.
DogecoinDogecoin CoreNodes and miners run Dogecoin Core. Proof-of-work: a bug would split the chain rather than halt it.
Hyperliquidhl-nodeValidators run Hyperliquid's own node software, which is not open source.
MonadMonad clientValidators run the Monad client from Category Labs, the only implementation.

It has already happened

  • Ethereum, 4 Dec 2025: the Prysm bug after Fusaka. Voting participation fell to ~74.7-75% (sync participation 75%) at epoch 411448, from >99% normally; missed-slot rate 18.5%; ~41-42 epochs affected; ~382 ETH in attestation rewards lost. Not lost: participation stayed ~9 points above the 2/3 threshold. Prysm's postmortem says a client with more than 1/3 share would have caused a temporary loss of finality. Source
  • Sui, 28–30 May 2026: three halts in 48 hours after v1.72. A gas-charging bug in the new address-balances feature crashed validators twice; the restart to fix it then hit a second bug in randomness setup. Every validator runs the same sui-node, so each bug stopped the whole network. Sui postmortem
  • Solana, 6 Feb 2024: five-hour halt. A bug in the Agave validator (v1.17) left nearly all validators stuck in a loop. Firedancer was not yet in use on mainnet. Source
How this works and where the data comes from

Ethereum execution and consensus shares come from clientdiversity.org data (supermajority.info and Miga Labs). Solana shares are by active stake from the Stakewiz validator list, grouping builds by the code they are based on. Bitcoin shares count reachable nodes by their user agent in the latest Bitnodes crawl. For chains with no public census we state what the official repositories and docs show: usually a single implementation. Thresholds follow ethereum.org's client-diversity page.

Sources: clientdiversity.org; Stakewiz; Bitnodes; ethereum.org: client diversity

Information only, not financial advice. Data comes from public sources and can be delayed or wrong; check the primary source before acting.

Scroll to Top
Chain Report
Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.